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Abstract
Background: The human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine is a major advancement in cancer prevention and this primary prevention
tool has the potential to reduce and eliminate HPV-associated cancers; however, the safety and efficacy of vaccines in general
and the HPV vaccine specifically have come under attack, particularly through the spread of misinformation on social media.
The popular social media platform Instagram represents a significant source of exposure to health (mis)information; 1 in 3 US
adults use Instagram.
Objective: The objective of this analysis was to characterize pro- and anti-HPV vaccine networks on Instagram, and to describe
misinformation within the anti-HPV vaccine network.
Methods: From April 2018 to December 2018, we collected publicly available English-language Instagram posts containing
hashtags #HPV, #HPVVaccine, or #Gardasil using Netlytic software (n=16,607). We randomly selected 10% of the sample and
content analyzed relevant posts (n=580) for text, image, and social media features as well as holistic attributes (eg, sentiments,
personal stories). Among antivaccine posts, we organized elements of misinformation within four broad dimensions: 1)
misinformation theoretical domains, 2) vaccine debate topics, 3) evidence base, and 4) health beliefs. We conducted univariate,
bivariate, and network analyses on the subsample of posts to quantify the role and position of individual posts in the network.
Results: Compared to provaccine posts (324/580, 55.9%), antivaccine posts (256/580, 44.1%) were more likely to originate
from individuals (64.1% antivaccine vs 25.0% provaccine; P<.001) and include personal narratives (37.1% vs 25.6%; P=.003).
In the antivaccine network, core misinformation characteristics included mentioning #Gardasil, purporting to reveal a lie (ie,
concealment), conspiracy theories, unsubstantiated claims, and risk of vaccine injury. Information/resource posts clustered around
misinformation domains including falsification, nanopublications, and vaccine-preventable disease, whereas personal narrative
posts clustered around different domains of misinformation, including concealment, injury, and conspiracy theories. The most
liked post (6634 likes) in our full subsample was a positive personal narrative post, created by a non-health individual; the most
liked post (5604 likes) in our antivaccine subsample was an informational post created by a health individual.
Conclusions: Identifying characteristics of misinformation related to HPV vaccine on social media will inform targeted
interventions (eg, network opinion leaders) and help sow corrective information and stories tailored to different falsehoods.
(J Med Internet Res 2020;22(12):e21451) doi: 10.2196/21451
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Introduction
Approximately 80 million people in the United States, or about
1 in 4, are infected with human papillomavirus (HPV), and 14
million new cases of HPV will occur each year [1]. Certain
strains of HPV are responsible for over 90% of anal and cervical
cancers, 70% of vaginal and vulvar cancers, and 60% of penile
and oropharynx cancers [1]. The HPV vaccine is a major
advancement in cancer prevention, and this primary prevention
tool has the potential to reduce and eliminate HPV-associated
cancers.
In 2016, the National HPV Vaccination Roundtable identified
social media as the top priority to strengthen vaccine confidence
and increase HPV vaccination rates [2], and, more recently, the
National Institutes of Health underscored its support for digital
health behavior research [3]. Research on the HPV vaccine and
social media has emerged across various platforms including
Twitter [4-7], YouTube [8], Facebook [9], Instagram [10,11],
and online media more broadly [12]. Studies show that
provaccine content on social media is sizeable [5,6]; however,
exposure to negative vaccine content may lead to the formation
of negative opinions and subsequent sharing of antivaccine
content [4], thus contributing to and perpetuating antivaccine
content on social media. The HPV vaccine has come under
attack, particularly through the spread of misinformation, as
falsehoods and unsubstantiated claims attempt to discredit the
science behind the safety and efficacy of the vaccine [13]. Social
media is an important resource for health information, and, at
the same time, represents a significant source of exposure to
health misinformation [14].
The popular social media platform Instagram represents a
significant source of exposure to health information and
misinformation [14]; 1 in 3 US adults use Instagram [15]. Nearly
50% of adults ages 30-49 years use Instagram [16],
corresponding to a key demographic of parents who likely have
age-eligible children (9-14 years old) for the HPV vaccine and
may be looking for information on social media. However,
research examining Instagram data has been slower to emerge
compared with other platforms, in part due to limited data access
and the platform culture of posting only to closed networks of
friends. To date, health-related research on Instagram has
focused on characterizing images for content and theme [17]
and geo-spatial analysis [18]. To our knowledge, only 2 studies
have examined the HPV vaccine on Instagram [10,11], and both
characterized pro- and antivaccine content. Our study extends
this work by characterizing domains of misinformation among
anti-HPV vaccine posts on Instagram and also by conducting
a network analysis of post characteristics based on image and
text features. While social network analysis has been used to
better understand interactions on other social media platforms
such as Facebook [19] and Twitter [20], few have studies used
it to understand Instagram [21].
Misinformation, specifically spread through social media and
other online platforms, is a major threat to public health and
medicine [13]. Addressing misinformation on social media
requires a proactive approach. To be proactive, we must first
understand what types of misinformation are present. However,
developing strategies to address misinformation requires more
effort, including cultivating an understanding of the following:
what types of messages are being shared and by whom; how
the relationship between posts, hashtags, and various text/image
characteristics reflect pro- and anti-HPV vaccine domains; and
how to leverage these network relationships to address
misinformation. To address these goals, this study uses mixed
methods (qualitative and quantitative social network analysis)
to examine four research questions:
1. How do Instagram post characteristics (such as format,
source, and content) differ by HPV vaccine sentiment?
2. What are the salient dimensions of misinformation among
anti-HPV vaccine Instagram posts?
3. What is the network structure of pro- and anti-HPV vaccine
Instagram post characteristics?
4. How do position (centrality) and popularity (number of
likes) of posts vary by post characteristics and domains of
misinformation?
Methods
Study Design and Sampling
Between April 2018 and December of 2018, we used Netlytic
[22] software to collect public Instagram posts. We collected
data by accessing Instagram’s public application programming
interface, meeting the company’s terms of service for public
data, and collected up to 100 new posts per hour. If more than
100 posts with a particular hashtag/keyword were posted per
hour, only the most recent were retrieved. In December 2018,
Instagram closed its application programming interface and
data collection through Netlytic was no longer possible [23].
As such, all data for this study were collected prior to the
application programming interface closure. The data collection
method in this study is similar to that used in prior Instagram
research [10,18,24].
Drawing from prior social media studies on this topic [4-6] and
working to maximize the number of relevant of posts (ie, signal)
while limiting irrelevant posts (ie, noise), we used the hashtag
search criteria “#HPV,” “#HPVVaccine,” and “#Gardasil”.
These 3 hashtags created 3 separate datasets totaling 126,327
posts. We created a merged dataset (n=48,921) after removing
duplicate posts. In this merged dataset, we excluded
non-English-language posts (two-thirds of the sample) using
Google’s translation application programming interface [25] to
create a final sample of 16,607 posts. No private Instagram
posts were included in our sample. All study procedures were
approved by the institutional review board at Drexel University.
Content Analysis
We randomly selected 1660 of the 16,607 posts (approximately
10% of the final sample) to create a subsample for content
analysis. Posts in the subsample that were not relevant to the
J Med Internet Res 2020 | vol. 22 | iss. 12 | e21451 | p. 2https://www.jmir.org/2020/12/e21451
(page number not for citation purposes)
Massey et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH
XSL•FO
RenderX
HPV vaccine (eg, about HPV more generally or another vaccine)
were not analyzed (n=757). Additionally, posts in the subsample
were not analyzed if we could not access the image through the
hyperlink in our dataset (n=298). Working hyperlinks were
unavailable if the post had been deleted since data collection,
or if the user had changed the account privacy settings. Our
content analyzed subsample included 605 posts. Manifest
characteristics of posts’ imagery, caption texts, and holistic post
attributes (ie, source, context/style, and sentiment) were coded
using a modified version of a codebook (see Multimedia
Appendix 1) previously tested for reliability in analyzing
HPV-related Instagram posts [10].
We organized elements of misinformation within four broad
dimensions based on a review of the literature: 1)
misinformation theoretical domains, 2) vaccine debate topics,
3) evidence base, and 4) health beliefs. Misinformation
theoretical domains drew from Information Manipulation Theory
as adapted and defined by Zhou and Zhang [26], and included
concealment (ie, purporting to reveal a lie), ambivalence (ie,
raising questions), distortion (ie, misrepresenting original
information), and falsification (ie, fabricating information).
Vaccine debate topics included common themes and ideas that
are shared in antivaccine communities, including vaccine
inefficacy, civil liberties, alternative medicine, ideology, and
conspiracy theories [27]. Evidence base was defined as the type
of information cited as the basis for assertions about the HPV
vaccine, including nanopublications (eg, academic manuscripts),
vaccine injury stories, and unsubstantiated claims (ie, no
scientific evidence provided). Finally, we included constructs
from the Health Belief Model [28] that captured risk (ie, severity
and susceptibility) of vaccine-related injury and
vaccine-preventable diseases, barriers and benefits of not
vaccinating, and self-efficacy to not vaccinate (ie, cues to action,
perceived behavioral control). All misinformation elements
were coded independently and were not mutually exclusive.
Content analysis of the subsample was completed by four
members of the study team who had previously analyzed HPV
vaccine posts on Instagram [10]. The study team classified
multiple samples of posts and resolved coding discrepancies
through iterative review and refinement of the codebook. This
coding method has been used widely in social media content
analysis [4,5]. Our full codebook is provided as supplemental
material, defining each subdomain (Multimedia Appendix 1).
To identify the presence of keywords in the caption text of posts,
we searched for characters in a string that represented topics
relevant to HPV vaccine characteristics (eg, “cancer,” “CDC”).
We also searched post metadata to identify hashtags; mentions;
reposts; and, if a location was included, relevant social media
characteristics. The caption text and social media characteristics
were then examined vis-à-vis vaccine sentiment.
Network Analysis of Posts and Hashtags
We constructed a 2-mode affiliation network of the relationship
between Instagram posts and coded HPV vaccine terms and
characteristics. We constructed two networks: (a) 580 x 14
“general” network comprising 580 pro- and antivaccine posts
and the 14 terms mentioned, and (b) a 256 x 23 subnetwork of
256 antivaccine posts and the 23 misinformation
dimensions/domains/themes and hashtags. The cells Xij in each
of the networks’ rectangular matrices take the value “1” if a
post mentions a specific term (or in the case of the antivaccine
network, if a post is associated with a specific
domain/dimension/theme), and “0”, if otherwise. We also
captured pertinent post characteristics (“attributes”); these
include the presence of text/images in posts, social media
features such as links, and other holistic features such as post
sentiment, source, and context (for both the “general” and
antivaccine networks). The resultant visualization of these
networks, produced by UCINET/Netdraw [26] software’s graph
theoretic spring-embedding algorithm, are shown in Figures 1
and 2.
We used UCINET software [29] to compute degree centrality,
an indicator of how connected or popular a single node is and
how likely such a node is in transmission of information through
a network. Degree centrality measures the absolute number of
other nodes that each node is connected to. Additionally,
UCINET’s core-periphery procedures determined the presence
of key content clusters, distinguishing between “core” and
“peripheral” characteristics in the general- and antivaccine
networks. Core-periphery analysis allows for the examination
of the extent to which groups are clustered and communicate
about issues of mutual interest, as well as how content clusters
are grouped around diverse and loosely connected sets of topics,
posts, or issues [30].
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Figure 1. Two-mode visualization (n=580 posts; neutral posts excluded). Includes image, caption, and social media characteristics. Variables colored
by type of characteristic. Sized by likes (mean=145.8; median=21; maximum=6634). Top two posts with the most likes are indicated. Symbol shapes
represent post source. Color represents node type. Rim color indicates post context. Yellow = social media features. Light blue = image characteristics.
Dark blue = caption text characteristics. Red = antivaccine. Green = provaccine. Black rim = personal narrative. White rim = information/resource.
Circle = general group. Square = general individual. Triangle = health group. Diamond = health individual.
Figure 2. Antivaccine network visualization (n=256 posts). Variables colored by type of characteristic. Sized by likes (mean=220.9; median=27;
maximum=5604). Top three posts with the most likes are indicated. Includes image, type of misinformation, and social media characteristics. Symbol
shapes represent post source. Color represents node type. Yellow = social media features. Light blue = image characteristics. Dark blue = type of
misinformation. Black = personal narrative. White = information/resource. Circle = general group. Square = general individual. Triangle = health group.
Diamond = health individual.
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Statistical analyses included both univariate and bivariate
analyses and were conducted in STATA/IC Version 15 software
[31]. Simple descriptive statistics were generated for pro- and
antivaccine posts separately and in aggregate. Among both pro-
and antivaccine posts, t tests and analysis of variance (ANOVA)
assessed differences in ‘like’ count by post characteristics.
chi-squared tests assessed differences in the distribution of
characteristics between pro- and antivaccine posts.
Results
Inclusion and Exclusion
Of the relevant and working 605 posts in our subsample, a small
proportion (n=25, 4.1% coded posts) were determined to be
neutral (ie, neither pro- nor antivaccine), and were therefore
excluded from subsequent analyses. Thus, the final analytic
sample included 256 antivaccine posts and 324 provaccine posts
(n=580 total).
Content Analysis
Intercoder reliability was assessed using percentage agreement
throughout the codebook development process (mean
agreement=0.87, SD=0.09). Following codebook development,
members of the study were randomly assigned unique samples
of posts to code, as well as an additional sample of shared posts
to again evaluate intercoder reliability (mean agreement=0.85,
SD=0.09), ensuring our coding process was rigorous and
replicable. Agreement for individual codes ranged from 0.67
(susceptibility of vaccine-related injury) to 1.0 (barriers to not
vaccinating).
Table 1 summarizes coded post characteristics and social media
features, stratified by vaccine sentiment. The majority of posts
were provaccine (324/580, 55.9%). Individuals were the most
frequent type of post source (245/580, 42.2%), followed by
health non-individuals (151/580, 26.0%, general non-individuals
(102/580, 17.6%), and health individuals (82/580, 14.1%).
Nearly 7 in 10 posts contained information or resources
(402/580, 69.3%) compared to personal narratives (178/580,
30.7%). Many post visuals were either imagery-only (187/580,
32.2%) or noninfographic combinations of text and imagery
(173/580, 29.8%). Most posts included at least one person
(329/580, 56.7%), such as a vaccine-eligible child (269/580,
46.4%), a health professional (91/580, 15.7%), or
parent/caregiver (30/580, 5.2%). Females were depicted more
than twice as frequently as males (females=134/580, 23.1%;
males=58/580, 10.0%). Antivaccine posts received significantly
more likes compared to provaccine posts (220.9 mean likes vs
86.3 mean likes, respectively; P=.003). Posts containing personal
narratives received significantly more likes compared to posts
containing information/resources (217.5 mean likes vs 114.0
mean likes, respectively; P=.033).
Significant differences were found between characteristics of
pro- and antivaccine posts (see Table 1). Compared to
provaccine posts, antivaccine posts were more likely to originate
from non-health individuals (164/256, 64.1% antivaccine vs
81/324, 25.0% provaccine; P<.001), include personal narrative
(95/256, 37.1% vs 83/324, 25.6%; P=.003), or show a
parent/caregiver (21/256, 8.2% vs 9/324, 2.8%; P=.003).
Antivaccine posts were also more likely to mention another
Instagram user (115/256, 44.9% antivaccine vs 87/324, 26.9%
provaccine; P<.001), include a link (75/256, 29.3% vs 51/324,
15.7%; P<.001), or be a repost of another post (79/256, 30.9%
vs 23/324, 7.1%; P<.001). Provaccine posts were more likely
than antivaccine posts to include location information (80/324,
24.7% vs 9/256, 3.5%; P<.001). Finally, vaccine sentiment was
a significant determinant of which hashtags were included, with
antivaccine posts using #Gardasil significantly more often than
provaccine posts (P<.001), and provaccine posts using #HPV
(P<.001) and #HPVvaccine (P<.001) more than antivaccine
posts.
Table 2 presents coding results and mean like counts for
misinformation elements from antivaccine posts only (n=256).
Concealment and distortion were the most frequent
misinformation theoretical domains (135/256, 52.7% and
84/256, 32.8%, respectively). The most common vaccine debate
topics were conspiracy theories (144/256, 56.3%) and vaccine
inefficacy (72/256, 28.1%). Nearly three quarters of antivaccine
posts offered unsubstantiated claims (185/256, 72.3%). The
majority of posts highlighted the risk of vaccine-related injury:
approximately 8 in 10 (205/256, 80.1%) discussed severity and
approximately 6 in 10 (163/256, 63.7%) discussed susceptibility.
One fifth of posts discussed the risks of vaccine-preventable
diseases, primarily by downplaying susceptibility (41/256,
16.0%) of vaccine-preventable diseases. Building self-efficacy
to not vaccinate was another key component of posts: 40.2%
(103/256) of posts promoted one’s behavioral control over not
vaccinating, and 39.8% (102/256) mentioned tangible cues to
action such as links to vaccine exemption forms.
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Table 1. Frequency and proportion of Instagram post characteristics (ie, image, text, and social media features) for pro- and antivaccine posts. Results
ordered descending by total frequency. Mean like counts and SDs are provided for all posts. Chi-squared tests assessed significant differences in
distribution of post characteristics between pro- and antivaccine posts (alpha=.05).











64.125132.2 (539.8)245 (42.2)General individual
741.1109.2 (464.8)151 (26.0)Health non-individual
17.617.6174.8 (418.5)102 (17.6)General non-individual
11.316.4217.5 (749.9)82 (14.1)Health individual
0.003Post content





44.118.5181.8 (459.2)173 (29.8)Text + imagery: noninfographic
12.513207.9 (891.6)74 (12.8)Text-only





37.531.8184.5 (615.4)199 (34.3)1 person
20.719.8100.7 (330.4)117 (20.2)2-9 persons
2.32.2143.3 (332.0)13 (2.2)10+ persons
0.02Vaccine-eligible person shown
5254.9146.4 (545.4)311 (53.6)None
26.620.4166.2 (671.1)134 (23.1)Female(s) only
11.39172.2 (398.8)58 (10.0)Male(s) only
4.311.1108.8 (329.9)47 (8.1)Both male(s) and female(s)
5.94.654.8 (177.3)30 (5.2)Unable to determine
Other image elements
0.1528.122.8158.7 (472.0)146 (25.2)Vaccine shown
0.00510.919.4110.4 (347.7)91 (15.7)Health professional shown
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<.0012.7335.1990.1 (450.9)121 (20.9)#HPV + #HPVVaccine
<.00122.711.7148.4 (379.6)96 (16.6)#HPV + #Gardasil
<.00112.11.897.1 (368.3)37 (6.4)#HPVVaccine + #Gardasil
0.163.15.6151.1 (486.3)26 (4.5)#HPV + #HPVVaccine + #Gardasil
Social media characteristics
<.00144.926.9123.5 (362.3)202 (34.8)Other user mentioned
<.00129.315.7142.4 (446.5)126 (21.7)Link included
<.00130.97.1110 (336)102 (17.6)Post is a repost
<.0013.524.778.6 (312.1)89 (15.3)Location included
aN/A: Not applicable.
bNeutral posts excluded from subsequent analyses.
Table 2. Frequency and proportion of misinformation characteristics of antivaccine Instagram posts (n=256). Results ordered descending by frequency.
All characteristics were coded independently and were not mutually exclusive. Not shown (<10%): severity of vaccine-preventable diseases, benefits
of not vaccinating, barriers to not vaccinating.

















0.801214.9 (599.8)205Severity of vaccine-related injury
0.637192.5 (464.8)163Susceptibility of vaccine-related injury
0.402306.8 (772.9)103Perceived behavioral control
0.398286.9 (771.1)102Cues to action
0.16253 (594.2)41Susceptibility to vaccine-preventable diseases
aDegree centrality an indicator of how connected a single characteristic is and how likely such a characteristic is in transmission of information and
resources through a network; the higher the measure the more common or frequently occurring the feature is in the network. Average degree centrality
in antivaccine network was 0.336 (SD=0.219).
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Figure 1 presents the 2-mode network visualization of the coded
subsample (n=580 posts). Different hashtags were used
preferentially depending on a post’s vaccine sentiment.
#Gardasil was core to the antivaccine network, whereas
#HPVvaccine and #HPV were both core to the provaccine
network. Text including risk, study, and educate all gravitated
towards #Gardasil and were central to the antivaccine network,
whereas text including prevention and cancer both gravitated
towards #HPV and were central to the provaccine network.
Although provaccine posts were more common, antivaccine
posts included many more nodes with black rims, indicating
that the post was personal narrative as opposed to
information/resource (displayed with a white rim). The post
nodes were sized proportionate to the number of likes received
– the most liked post (n=6634 likes) in our subsample was a
positive personal narrative post, created by a non-health
individual (located in the upper left quadrant of the network
diagram).
Figure 2 presents only the antivaccine network (n=256 posts)
with additional characteristics of misinformation. The position
of theoretical dimensions of misinformation varied. Concealment
was located in the core of the network, whereas distortion,
falsification, and ambivalence were more peripheral. In addition,
unsubstantiated claims and vaccine injury stories were core
pieces of evidence to the network. With respect to health belief
model constructs, risk of vaccine injury and self-efficacy to not
vaccinate were located in the core of the antivaccine network.
Finally, posts that tap on conspiracy theories and vaccine
inefficacy were central and located in the core of the network,
whereas those tapping on vaccine debate topics, ideology,
alternative medicine, and civil liberties were in the periphery.
As shown in Figure 2, social media features (colored in yellow)
such as use of hashtags, links, and mentioning other users were
also located in the center of the network. Information/resource
posts (colored in white) clustered around misinformation
domains including falsification, nanopublications, and
vaccine-preventable disease; whereas personal narrative posts
(colored in black) clustered around different domains of
misinformation, including concealment (ie, revealing lies),
injury, and conspiracy theories. Finally, post nodes were sized
proportionate to the number of likes received – the most liked
post (n=5604 likes) in our antivaccine subsample was an
informational post created by a health individual (a white
diamond located in the lower left quadrant of the network
diagram).
On average, degree centrality in the antivaccine network was
0.336 (SD=0.219). As shown in Table 2, degree centrality for
posts ranged from 0.102 (ideological) to 0.801 (vaccine injury
severity). Common misinformation elements of the antivaccine
network with degree centrality scores greater than 0.5 included
concealment (0.527), conspiracy theories (0.563),
unsubstantiated claim (0.723), severity of vaccine-related injury
(0.801), and susceptibility of vaccine-related injury (0.637).
Instagram posts that exemplify the common misinformation
elements are included as Multimedia Appendix 2.
Discussion
Instagram Post Characteristics by HPV Vaccine
Sentiment
The majority of Instagram posts in our HPV vaccine sample
were provaccine and used hashtags #HPV and #HPVvaccine.
Antivaccine posts received on average more likes than
provaccine and were more likely to use #Gardasil. Use of social
media features also varied by post sentiment. Antivaccine posts
were more likely to mention another Instagram user (ie, direct
communication), and provaccine posts were more likely to
include location information – suggesting differences in how
the two groups connect with others and share information. For
example, antivaccine posts included location information
significantly less often than provaccine posts, and the presence
or absence of geotagging may be an important marker for the
transparency and credibility of content creators [32]. Finally,
in our sample, more posts contained information/resources
compared to personal narratives, and the latter received more
likes on average, demonstrating the power and popularity of a
story. These results confirm and extend findings from a study
that used a more limited dataset [10].
Our findings examining Instagram data support research
conducted on other social media platforms related to the HPV
vaccine. Similar to our findings, Twitter studies have found the
majority of content to be provaccine [5,6]. On YouTube,
pro-HPV vaccine content relied heavily on information and
evidence (as compared to personal stories), and antivaccine
content on YouTube focused on side effects and conspiracy
theories [8]. While our findings support prior work on other
social media platforms, it also extends this knowledge base by
examining misinformation domains.
Dimensions of Misinformation Among Anti-HPV
Vaccine Posts
Our network diagram related to misinformation among
antivaccine posts (Figure 2) not only highlights domains and
topics that cluster together (eg, conspiracy, injury, and
concealment vs behavioral control, vaccine inefficacy, and
distortion) but also the post characteristics that group around
each cluster (eg, personal narrative vs information/resources).
This may inform public health messaging to better pair with
existing content. For instance, personal narrative posts may be
better suited to address conspiracy than information/resource
posts. In our antivaccine sample, misinformation was
represented through core elements, including posts using
concealment strategies, posts highlighting conspiracy theories,
posts basing claims on unsubstantiated evidence and personal
anecdotes (eg, injury), and posts raising awareness of
vaccine-related injury severity and susceptibility. Multimedia
Appendix 2 provides three sample posts that exemplify each of
the core misinformation elements.
Concealment was the core misinformation theoretical domain
in our subsample’s network. Posts that used concealment as the
vehicle for misinformation purported to reveal a lie or expose
previously unknown facts. An example provided from our data
demonstrated that a “new study” helped to reveal previously
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“unknown facts” about the HPV vaccine trials. While not a core
component of the network, distortion also demonstrated high
degree centrality. Whereas concealment posts shined a light on
information, distortion posts created false light, presenting one
or more potentially true pieces of evidence to imply correlation,
causation, or comparison between them. Distortion was
particularly salient among injury stories that drew links between
receiving a vaccine and injury. The concealment and distortion
misinformation domains warrant unique strategies to address
hesitancy, fear, or doubt that may arise from exposure to such
information.
Conspiracy theories were also core to the antivaccine network
and included posts that claimed various actors (eg, government,
nonprofit, or industry) wanted to promote HPV vaccination for
nefarious reasons. Conspiracy is not a new topic among vaccines
or health more broadly, and strategies to address this type of
misinformation may seek to identify hidden agendas or groups
with self-serving interests, including but not limited to financial
interests. Other strategies to address conspiracy may be to
identify groups that feel alienated and create opportunities for
dialogue [33].
A third core component of misinformation posts was the use of
unsubstantiated or anecdotal evidence (eg, personal experiences)
to corroborate falsehoods. Posts that claimed vaccines cause
autism or SIDS (sudden infant death syndrome), for instance,
are examples of unsubstantiated evidence as there is scientific
evidence to support the contrary [34]. On the other hand, many
posts focused on injury as evidence for antivaccine sentiment
based on personal or anecdotal experiences. Public health
professionals have better developed tools to address
misinformation that is “evidence based” or falsehoods that are
based on shaky science. However, the tools or resources needed
to address an antivaccine story about a personal experience may
need to better incorporate emotional evidence, acknowledging
the struggle or emotions elicited by the story and using these
same emotions to redirect the narrative. Medical professionals
are taught to show empathy towards a patient; public health
professionals can draw from this to build additional tools to
combat misinformation on social media.
Finally, as related to health beliefs, misinformation posts focused
on severity and susceptibly of vaccine-related injury. Severity
posts fixated on harmful side effects, illnesses, and even death
– not to mention possible unknown long-term effects.
Susceptibly, on the other hand, included arguments about the
commonality of side effects and the number of vaccines on the
childhood schedule, therefore overloading the immune system.
This last sentiment may be particularly salient to parents who
are concerned with the HPV vaccine being routinely given with
the meningococcal and Tdap vaccines.
Limitations
Our study has limitations worth noting. First, our sample was
created using three hashtags, limiting the generalizability of our
findings. We mitigated this potential bias by using three
common hashtags that have been used in other studies and have
been shown to include both pro- and antivaccine content [4,5].
Second, we examined misinformation domains only among
antivaccine posts. While provaccine posts may contain false
information, we focused on antivaccine posts. Third, our
unobtrusive methodology is unable to measure actual exposure
to posts or determine if exposure was associated with health
knowledge, attitudes, or practices. Additionally, Instagram’s
application programming interface did not generate user
information beyond the user’s account name, so follower counts
were not available during our analysis as a measure of potential
exposure. Future research may consider examining differences
in posts from users with larger versus smaller followings.
Fourth, we included mean and not median like count in our
analysis. The median number of likes for antivaccine posts was
27 (mean=220.9), and for provaccine posts was 18 (mean=86.3),
confirming prior reporting that engagement measures such as
likes are right-skewed because a minority of posts receive a
disproportionate share of likes [35];this is a typical phenomenon
in social media research and practice. Although the mean and
median like counts differ in terms of magnitude, they do not
differ directionally. Moreover, posts were created at different
times and therefore had varying amounts of time to accumulate
likes. However, because most social media engagement occurs
within a short amount of time immediately following the
creation of a post, the impact on our findings was likely minimal.
Furthermore, in our analytic sample, like count was not
associated with the number of posts created by a given user
(P=.909; results not presented), suggesting that no one user
dominated or influenced the number of likes. Additionally, our
decision to randomly sample posts did not allow for us to
examine temporal trends and future studies may consider a
stratified sampling approach by week or another unit of time.
Finally, we did not identify bot activity nor attempt to identify
automation or nonhuman interactions. This activity could lead
to artificially high engagement with specific types of content
and warrants additional investigation to determine the presence
and proliferation of misinformation resulting from automated
activity. Despite these limitations, our findings help characterize
misinformation about the HPV vaccine on Instagram and
provide a footing for future research in this field.
Conclusion
Health misinformation on social media is diverse, tapping into
states of reason to emotion. Identifying characteristics of health
misinformation on social media will help inform targeted
interventions and tailored messages to sow corrective
information and stories [36]. The American Heart Association’s
ReSS (Resuscitation Science Symposium) social media
campaign [37] used a small group of resuscitation science
professionals to create (corrective) content in online social media
platforms, leading to significant end user engagement with the
content. Similar interventions have been documented in other
settings [38]. If the public health and medical community wants
to be at the center of the social media network and discussion
about the HPV vaccine, it must understand and consider similar
strategies. Misinformation characteristics can be identified and
segmented for focused interventions through opinion-leader or
peer outreach education programs.
Communication strategies that only leverage conventional health
experts and authorities are ill-equipped to address
misinformation on social media. The rise of “expert patients”
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and “expert parents” has been in part due to their proficient use
of social media network features, along with the saliency and
relatedness of their stories. Addressing misinformation on social
media will require resource development and enthusiasm across
multiple industries and health consumer types, including tech
and health insurance companies, hospital and physician groups,
and parent and cancer survivor advocates.
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